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ABSTRACT 
 
The basic objective of this paper is to examine the effect of military spending on income 
inequality in four major South Asian economies. In the process, we also control for other 
possible key determinants of income inequality subject to data availability. Using panel 
regression fixed effects analysis for the study period 1975 to 2005, we find from our 
estimates that there is a positive effect of military expenditure on income inequality. Also 
we find there is a direct relationship between wartime military spending and income 
inequality and an inverse relationship between peacetime military spending and income 
inequality. Given the wide range of socio economic and political problems ailing South 
Asia, these results gain paramount importance, suggesting that reduction in military 
spending could reduce income inequality, thereby paving way for economic development 
and progress. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A large number of previous works in literature have focused on the determinants of 
military expenditure in developing countries which is important given the negative effect 
of militarization on economic growth and development
1. The effects of military spending 
on other key macro economic variables have also been explored in the literature. But, the 
relationship between defense sector growth and income inequality is largely left 
uncovered. Traditionally, the studies in literature related to military spending was mostly 
on issues concerning to income, economic growth, development, social sector 
development, education, health, employment, inflation and spillover effects on other 
industries. We do agree with these wide range of concerns raised by some of the prolific 
studies in past, but we also believe that there is strong evidence especially in developing 
countries that military expenditure is also strongly associated with income inequality. 
Though there are some studies by Abell (1994), Hamid Ali & Galbraith (2005), concreate 
studies on South Asia are absent. This paper tries to fill this existing gap in the first place 
by empirically testing the implications of military spending on income inequality of four 
major South Asian economies namely, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.  We 
then share one major criticism of early empirical works
2 on the link between military 
spending and income inequality is the problem of endogenity. The causality could well 
run in both directions. In determining the income inequality, it is possible that there can 
be endogenity problem with military spending. But, the earlier works were largely based 
on OLS regressions, treating military spending as exogenous to the income inequality. 
We believe that the natural progression from this is to address the problem of endogenity 
of military spending by creating appropriate set of instrument variables estimator. We 
also confirm this by conducting endogenity test in two stages.  
 
Opportunity Cost Burden Effect: The Theoretical Underpinning 
 
We formulate Opportunity Cost Burden Effect model which explains the implication of 
higher defense spending on government resources and the opportunity cost foregone 
towards spending on development purposes thereby leading to higher levels of 
inequalities. Based on this theoretical underpinning, the paper empirically examines the 
association between the military spending and income inequalities in South Asia.  This is 
a result of an effort to put in perspective in a model form as to how military spending can 
influence income inequality and at what cost does this military sector growth comes. 
Figure 1 illustrates how military sector growth affects the income inequality and social 
and human development in an economy at the expense of diminishing returns to social 
development sectors. As larger proportions of a country’s productive resources are 
diverted towards funding the military sector growth, its long run impact on development 
expenditure is expected to be negative. As defense spending increases rapidly, the total 
government expenditure also increases at a faster rate. But, this rapid increase in military 
                                                 
1 Detailed analysis large section of studies related to Military Expenditure and their effects have been 
covered extensively by Gleditsch, Bjerkholt, Cappelen, Smith & Dunne (1996) in the edited volume of the 
book, “The Peace Dividend” 
2 Exception from this being Hamid E Ali & Galbraith (2005) who address this problem using simultaneous 
equation method.   3
spending has a cost associated with it. This is because, to fund this ever increasing 
defense spending, the government would be forced
3 to cut its expenditure on other sectors 
(related to development). As defense spending growth increases beyond a point (P2) the 
development spending will start declining at a much faster rate.  
 
Figure – 1: Opportunity Cost Burden Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This means that the cost of the next best alternative use (opportunity cost) is forgone by 
the country as it diverts development expenditure towards funding the military sector 
growth requirements. Thus, we see two curves, one taking the form of convex which is 
the total military expenditure and the other taking the form of concave, development 
spending. Meaning, the net effect on overall economic growth may be positive, if the 
defense burden is smaller. This gives the government ample scope to divert the resources 
towards development spending, which would yield benefits in the form of higher human 
and social development thereby leading to lower income inequalities. On the contrary, as 
more of a country’s resources are diverted towards military sector growth, the net 
positive influence on development would start declining forcing to increase income 
inequalities. Since South Asia’s story fits exactly into this model, in the absence of any 
concrete research work on this region, this study based on the this theoretical 
                                                 
3 Sometimes in Democracies where there are coalition governments face this dilemma for cutting of the 
development spending because due to coalition pressures the government would not be in a position to cut 
the non development spending and hence would be left with other option to go for a cut in development 
spending. Also given the fact that this is the era of globalization, where we see decline in rate of both direct 
and indirect taxes on the name of reforms, it becomes even harder for the government to mop up the 
additional resources to fund the military expenditure. This also puts the pressure of the governments to cut 
the development spending in order to continue the funding for military sector. 
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underpinning makes an attempt to examine as to how the military spending continues to 
expand and thrive at the cost of creating wider income inequalities. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows: Section 2 of the paper presents research design and description of 
the variables. Section 3 discusses the results of estimating the models on cross-country 
time series data, while section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Research Design 
 
2.1. Modeling ‘Income Inequality & Military Spending’ 
 
To investigate the impact of military spending on income inequality, we start with the 
standard model. We presume that the there is a direct effect of higher military spending 
on inequality levels in our sample countries. To capture this, we include Gini income 
inequality index as the dependent variable. We adopt this data from WIDER institute’s 
Income Inequality data set – II (2007). The estimates of Gini coefficient are available 
only at points of time for the sample countries. We adopted interpolation technique to 
take the decline or growth in trend between two points in time and fill the data gapes 
between successive observations. There are also other studies who have adopted similar 
such approach like Jamal (2005) and Akmal et al. (2007). We first use a single equation 
method to investigate the impact of military spending on income inequality. We use 
pooled regression analysis with fixed effects method for all the models. The fixed effects 
method is performed in suspicion that there are other factors than those captured in our 
explanatory variables affecting the dependent variable(s). Thus, the model for income 
inequality can be specified in the following format: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1) 
 
ψ is the corresponding coefficients, Ω are the fixed effects to be estimated and ε is the 
error term. The model developed above for income inequality might face the problem of 
endogenity related to military spending. To counter this, we generate instrument variables 
to address the problem of endogenity. In this method, we create a variable or set of 
variables that is highly correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the 
disturbance term. Thus, it needs to satisfy both these propositions: 
 
  
 
……………………………… (2) 
Log(Gini) = δ1 + Ω1 + ψ2 log(Milex)it + ψ3 Milex * War yearsit + ψ4 Milex * Peace yearsit + ψ5 War yearsit 
+ ψ6 Pace yearsit + ψ7 Political Regimeit + ψ8 log(Population)it + ψ9 Secondary School 
Enrollment Ratioit + ψ10 Government Expenditureit + ψ11 log(Economic Development)it + 
ψ12 log(External Aid)it + ψ13 Time Dummyit + ψ14 + Economic Development Squaredit + ψ15 
Economic Growthit + ψ16 Economic Development Economic Growthit + εit 
   IV * Y 
                =    A Y   >   0 
       N   5
Where, IV is the Instrument Variable which we have formulated and Y is the endogenous 
variable. Therefore the instrument variable acts as proxy for the endogenous variable. 
 
 
……………………………… (3) 
It is quite difficult task to create the instrument variable(s) to satisfy both these aspects 
mentioned in equation 2 and 3. Hence we take the help of Two Stage Least Squares 
(TSLS) method. The advantageous feature of this method over Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squared (POLS) method is that, this creates an instrument that is correlated with the 
endogenous variable while uncorrelated with the disturbance term. That is, it separates 
the endogenous variable into two parts, one correlated with the disturbance term and 
another uncorrelated with the disturbance term. Then finally, it uses the second part as a 
substitute for endogenous variable to run the model.  
 
In this whole process, we have to be careful in identifying the proper instrument variables 
which should best represent military expenditure not just closely but also see to that there 
is no reverse causality between the two. Taking this into account we construct two 
instrument variables namely, remittances and internal threat. We adopt the data for 
remittances in current US$ millions from world development indicators 2006 of World 
Bank. We define internal threat based on the data availability factor which can act as 
proxy. Thus, we thought internally displaced population and migrants from home country 
to foreign countries together form internal threat variable. The data is adopted from 
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), World Refugee Survey 
(Annual Series) of Monty G. Marshall, Center for Systemic Peace (2006). 
 
Before, we get into the analysis of relationship between income inequality and military 
spending, as a curtain raiser, we present the model related to determinants of military 
spending in South Asia. There are many previous research studies that have worked on 
the determinants of military expenditure. Prominent among them are Maizels & Nissanke 
(1986); Dommen & Maizels (1988); Looney (1989); Hewitt, (1991); West (1992); Dunne 
& Mohammed, (1995); Batchelor et al (2002); Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003a); Dunne 
& Perlo-Freeman (2003). All these studies are based on cross-country regression models. 
Based on the literature, we formulate this model for South Asia with typical dependent 
variable as Military Expenditure in current US$ Millions, which includes both recurring 
and capital expenditure on defense. The data is adopted from the COW project study of 
Ghosn, Faten, Palmer & Bremer (2004) which ends the data in 2001. From there on, we 
took the data from World Development indictors 2006 of World Bank. Thus, our military 
expenditures equation is follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (4) 
  IV * ε 
    =     A ε   =   0 
     N
Log(Milex) =  α1 + λ1 + ф2 Arms Imports it + ф3 Arms Tradingit + ф4 Peace yearsit + ф5 War yearsit  
+ ф6 log(Rivals Milex(t-1))it + ф7 log(Neighbors Milex(t-1))it + ф8 log(Population)it +  
ф9 log(Economic Development)it + ф10 log(Armed Forces)it + ф11 Time Dummyit + ηit   6
ф is the corresponding coefficients, λ are the fixed effects to be estimated and η is the 
error term. This empirical analysis covers about four South Asian countries for the period 
1975 to 2005. The pooled time-series cross-sectional (TCSC) data may exhibit 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While these problems do not bias the 
estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for 
large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. However, they often tend to 
cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To 
deal with these problems, we estimated for all the models the Huber-White robust 
standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to 
both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation within the cross-section 
unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000). 
 
2.2. Key Independent Variables 
 
There are several set of variables which are main as well as control variables in 
determining the income inequality. We start with the model 1 on income inequality. 
Apart from military spending, we include the most important variables namely, economic 
development and economic growth. We predict that as the countries progress leading to 
higher economic growth and development, there should be decline in income inequality. 
This is well argued based on the Kuznets hypothesis theory (Kuznets, 1955) and other 
vast literature on inequality which shows that the inequality tends to fall as there is higher 
economic growth and development (Ahluwalia, M.S. 1976, Robinson, 1976, Loury, 
1981, Anand & Kanbur, 1993, Clarke 1995, Perotti 1996, Alesina & Perotti, 1996, 
Easterly 1999, Galbraith 1999, Barro, R.J. 2000, Forbes, 2000, Bourgignon & Morrisson, 
2002, Banerjee & Duflo, 2002, Galbraith & Kum 2002, Ali & Galbraith, 2005). We 
obtain the data for both these variables from World Development indicators 2006 of 
World Bank. We then include political regime variable which captures for the differential 
levels between democracy and autocracy from Marshall & Jaggers, (2005). The level of 
Democracy is constructed from the Polity IV database which rates each country on a 
democracy-autocracy scale. First, in the data base an autocracy variable is available, 
ranging from 0 to 10, with a larger number indicating a more autocratic government. Also 
available is an analogous democracy index ranges from 0 to 10, but with a larger number 
means a more democratic government. Thus our variable is the democracy index minus 
the autocracy index, a measure called polity 2 in the database. It captures the extent to 
which a political regime is responsible to its people, the larger the number the stronger 
the democratic checks on the political system. We predict that a move towards greater 
democratization process often tends to associate with fall in inequality. Though we fully 
agree that this may not be true in all cases, keeping in mind the sample countries, wherein 
all of them excepting India are either autocracies or partial democracy, this variable 
becomes even more important. There is a vast literature which shows that increased 
levels of secondary school enrollment ratio leads to decline in income inequality levels as 
this would have an indirect effect on improving the poor socio economic conditions of 
the poor (Breen and Cecilia 1999, Fielding 2002, Fielding & Torres, 2005, Rohrbach, 
2007). Basing on this argument, we included secondary school enrollment ratio which 
was adopted from the database of UNESCO. We believe that improvement in social 
sector spending has a spillover effect on reducing the poverty levels and also help in fall   7
of inequality levels. However, due to non availability of the data from 1975 for Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, we have to settle for total government expenditure, which is in our case 
the proxy for development spending. But there are studies in literature like Mupimpila 
(2005) and Davoodi et al. (2001) who found a robust relation between military spending 
and total government expenditure. The data for this also comes from World Bank’s 
development indicators 2006. We also wanted to see whether the support in the form of 
external aid is helping reduce the inequality levels or otherwise. We included external aid 
in current US$ millions sourced from world development indicators. Finally, we use the 
updated version of Uppsala dataset (2007) which captures the civil war and external war 
presence and formulate number of war years variable. The COW project study of 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2000) extended version was used to take into account the 
number of peace years for the sample countries.  
 
Coming to the model of determinants of military spending, we include the most important 
components like Arms Imports for which the data was secured from SIPRI database on 
arms trading. The increase in arms imports has a major say in increasing the military 
spending. The other important indicator is the Armed forces as often, the size of armed 
forces is an important determinant of military expenditures. Generally speaking, as the 
size of armed forces increases military spending should increase. We capture the effect of 
armed forces data partly from World Development Indicators and SIPRI’s database. We 
also include arms trade by following the rule of Hamid Ali & Galbraith (2005) creating 
Arms Trading Index (ATI) to distinguish the countries that both import and export arms 
from countries that only import them. For this an interactive dummy variable is 
formulated which interacts the dummy with arms export years and then interacted with 
arms imports. This apart, we also include economic development, as we expect that 
higher economic development process leads to higher military spending to cater to the 
needs of military sector demand. Similarly, we also include war years and number of 
peace years as the former leads to greater increase in military spending, while the later is 
always associated with reduction in military spending (Mohammad, 1999). Literature 
highlights that neighbors military spending often drives the home country military 
expenditure (Sandler & Hartley, 1995; Smith, 1995 Sun & Yu, 1999, O¨cal, 2003). To 
capture this effect, we not only consider the neighbor’s military expenditure, but we went 
a step ahead in also creating the dataset on rival’s military expenditure. For example, For 
India, the rival’s military spending includes that of Pakistan, China and Bangladesh. For 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, it would be India’s military spending. For Sri Lanka however, 
the problem is internal as the war is waged within the country with LTTE rebels. But, the 
absence of data on military spending of LTTE group forced us to take into account a 
proxy which can closely associate with rival’s military spending
4. Therefore, we take into 
account number of terror events for Sri Lanka as best available proxy.    
 
3. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
This section presents the results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of 
military spending on income inequality in South Asia. We present three models first of 
which includes determinants of military spending (table 1) followed by the main model 
                                                 
4 The data for number of terror events was adopted from Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) www.tkb.com   8
explaining the relationship between income inequality and military spending (table 3). 
We then control for endogenity problem of military spending and introduce Two State 
Least Squared (TSLS) as the third model and also conduct endogenity test (table 4). Each 
model consists of one standard model followed by other models which deal with 
introducing other important variables and interaction affects variables. Other important 
statistics for each model are presented at the end of each table. All the results include 
white Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance to counter the problem 
of Heteroskedasticity.  
 
We begin with model – 1, the results provide the first impression about the determinants 
of military sector spending in South Asia. The most interesting findings include that of 
war and peace years. When we introduced number of war years, we find a significant 
positive relationship with military spending. When we replaced this with number of 
peace years in the model 2, we find the results to be negative and statistically significant 
at 1% confidence level. However, the coefficient values for the both differs as we find 
that for peace years its slightly higher than war years, suggesting that peace brings 
reduction in excess military spending, which can be utilized for social sector 
development. 
 
  Table 1: Results of Military Expenditure equation 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Military Expenditure (US $ Mn) 
Variables  Standard Model 1  Model  2 
     
Constant 
-3.182  
(25.643) 
-5.883  
(27.61) 
Arms Imports  
0.001 * 
(4.14E) 
0.001 * 
(4.02E) 
Arms Trading Interaction 
-1.94E 
(2.66E) 
-1.48E 
(2.60E) 
War Years 
0.013 ** 
(0.005) 
---- 
Peace Years 
---- -0.027  * 
(0.009) 
Log(Rivals Military Spending (t-1)) 
0.048 + 
(0.034) 
0.060 *** 
(0.036) 
Log(Neighbors Military Spending(t-1)) 
0.699 * 
(0.181) 
0.769 * 
(0.166) 
Log(Population) 
0.262 
(1.460) 
0.206 
(1.519) 
Log(Economic Development) 
0.618 + 
(0.447) 
1.039 ** 
(0.424) 
Log(Armed Forces) 
0.510 * 
(0.145) 
0.466 * 
(0.142) 
Time Trend 
-0.007 
(0.035) 
-0.017 
(0.039) 
     
 
R-squared  0.958879  
Adjusted R-squared  0.954267    9
F-statistic  207.9238  
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 0.000000 
Total Observations  124 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Though we find arms trading interaction variable to be insignificant, we find that arms 
imports is significant at 1% confidence level in both the models. Higher the arms imports, 
greater the spending on military sector. The descriptive statistics detailed in table 2 tell 
the story about the arms imports in South Asia. On an average the arms imports went up 
from 1975 – 1985 period to 1985 – 1994 period and then steadily declined during 1975 – 
2005 period for all countries excepting Sri Lanka.  
 
Table 2: Arms Imports (average) in South Asia 
(Number of weapons) 
Period   India  Pakistan  Sri Lanka  Bangladesh 
1975 - 1984  1898.2  549.9  10  69 
1985 -1994  2558.3  618  43.2  110.1 
1995 - 2005  1421.27  492.73  67.73  75.55 
1975 - 2005  1941.90  551.58  41.19  84.58 
Source: SIPRI database on Arms Imports 
 
In the case of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the yesteryears of 1970s and 1980s were 
the most tensed periods
5 and hence more arms imports leading to greater defense build up 
in the region. However, during the mid 1990s to the present date, the average arms 
imports have considerably declined in these three countries, thanks to the ongoing peace 
process along with some reasonably good confidence building measures between India 
and Pakistan on border issue of Kashmir and similarly in the cases of India and 
Bangladesh and Indo-China. However, the case of Sri Lanka is unique as it has had no 
rivalry with its neighbors in the past. But, the country faces different kind of challenges 
in the form of armed internal state conflict initiated by the rebel LTTE militant group. 
The conflict between LTTE and government broke during 1983 and has been on surge 
since then. From the late 1980s the violence increased drastically and hence we can see a 
steady growth of arms imports for Sri Lanka during those three points of time.  
 
We introduced both the rivals and neighbors military expenditure in lagged values to see 
their effect on individual military sector spendings in the current year. Interestingly, we 
find that though both are relevant and are statistically significant too, the importance of 
neighbors’ military expenditure plays a key role in determining the military expenditure 
of the host country. The coefficient value of neighbors’ military spending variable is very 
strong in comparison to the rival’s military expenditure. However, we chose to downplay 
                                                 
5 In 1971 India helped Bangladesh attain independence by waging the war against Pakistan. The years 
followed by, there was a greater defense built up activities in both India and Pakistan on the issue related to 
Kashmir. Also, the cold war between US and USSR was also partly responsible for some tensed moments 
as India’s proximity with USSR saw US supporting the Pakistan in building their military capabilities in 
the form of arms exports and R&D support.   10
this importance and be cautious in reading the results of these two simply because, we 
could not manage the data of rivals’ military spending of LTTE group for Sri Lanka and 
choose to include number of terror events instead. Therefore, though the results are fairly 
strong, to an extent, reading too much into it to make a strong conclusion would not be 
accurate. The population levels though is insignificant, we find that economic 
development process is positively associated with higher levels of military spending and 
is statistically significant in both models. Finally, we include the armed forces size 
relative to population levels. We find in both the models that an increase in armed forces 
is positive and is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. The results show that a 
1% increase in armed forces leads to an increase of 51% in military expenditure. The data 
on armed forces show that there has been a steady increase in armed forces from 2002 
onwards for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, while there was a sudden surge in the case 
of Sri Lanka ever since the civil war broke out during 1983. 
 
We now move towards our main model whose focus is on the interrelationship between 
income inequality and military sector spending. Beginning with the standard model 3, we 
find the results on the expected lines of our arguments which we made earlier. We find 
that military expenditure is positively associated with income inequality in South Asia. In 
most of the models specified, it is statistically significant. We see that a 1% increase in 
military spending is leading to a 2% increase in income inequality. We then interacted the 
military expenditure with both peace and war years to see their effect on income 
inequality (see models 7 & 8). We find that military expenditure during the peace years 
has a significant negative effect on income inequality and is statistically significant at 5% 
confidence level. However, we could not find any statistical significance for military 
spending during the war years.  
 
Table 3: Results of Income Inequality equation 
 
Dependent Variable: Log GINI 
 
Variables 
Standard 
Model 3 
Model  4  Model  5  Model  6  Model  7  Model  8 
             
Constant 
-7.164 * 
(2.562) 
-7.389 * 
(2.223) 
-10.79 * 
(3.036) 
-7.690 * 
(2.180) 
-6.444 ** 
(2.605) 
-7.750 * 
(2.200) 
Log(Military Expenditure) 
0.020 ** 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.020 ** 
(0.010) 
----- ----- 
Military Expenditure X War 
Years 
----- ----- -----  -----  -----  6.19E 
(5.46E) 
Military Expenditure X Peace 
Years 
----- ----- -----  -----  -1.45E  ** 
(7.25E) 
----- 
War Years 
0.002 * 
(0.000) 
----- 0.003  * 
(0.000) 
0.002 * 
(0.000) 
0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
----- 
Peace Years 
----- -0.007  * 
(0.001) 
----- -----  -----  -0.007  * 
(0.001) 
Political Regime? 
-0.002 ** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 * 
(0.000) 
-0.002 * 
(0.000) 
-0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 * 
(0.000) 
-0.003 * 
(0.000) 
Log(Population) 
0.331 ** 
(0.131) 
0.367 * 
(0.116) 
0.721 * 
(0.171) 
0.354 * 
(0.114) 
0.307 ** 
(0.134) 
0.383 * 
(0.115)   11
Log(Economic Development) 
0.662 * 
(0.081) 
0.625 * 
(0.072) 
----- 0.694  * 
(0.068) 
0.626 * 
(0.082) 
0.656 * 
(0.077) 
Secondary School Enrollment 
-0.005 ** 
(0.001) 
-0.005 * 
(0.001) 
-0.003 * 
(0.001) 
-0.005 * 
(0.001) 
-0.005 * 
(0.001) 
-0.004 * 
(0.001) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.008 * 
(0.004) 
8.18E 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.008 ** 
(0.003) 
-0.002  
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Log(External Aid) 
0.047 * 
(0.011) 
0.041 * 
(0.012) 
0.043 * 
(0.011) 
0.046 * 
(0.011) 
0.052 * 
(0.011) 
0.039 * 
(0.012) 
Time Trend 
-0.019 * 
(0.004) 
-0.017 * 
(0.003) 
-0.025 * 
(0.004) 
-0.020 * 
(0.003) 
-0.016 * 
(0.004) 
-0.017 * 
(0.003) 
Economic Development 
----- -----  0.002  * 
(0.000) 
----- ----- ----- 
Economic Development 
Squared 
----- -----  -7.13E  * 
(2.25E) 
----- ----- ----- 
Economic Growth 
----- ----- -----  -0.010  * 
(0.002) 
----- ----- 
Economic Development X 
Growth 
----- ----- -----  5.62E 
(6.04E) 
----- ----- 
             
 
R-squared  0.917167  0.928419  0.932387  0.936633 0.916687 0.928875 
Adjusted R-squared  0.908212  0.920680  0.924396  0.928495 0.907680 0.921186 
F-statistic  102.4206  119.9739  116.6844  115.0821 101.7768 120.8035 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total Observations  124 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The results related to introduction of both war and peace years show that an increase in 
war years has a positive effect of income inequality leading to 0.20% increase for every 
1% hike. However, we find that the increase in peace years is leading to decline in 
income inequality. Though we agree that the coefficient values are very low, but 
nevertheless the results show that there is a direct relationship between military sector 
spending and income inequality at the backdrop of war and peace years. The interesting 
finding however is that 1% increase in peace years leads to 0.70% decline in income 
inequality, which is infact higher than the effect of war years on inequality. This once 
again reiterates the fact that war is detrimental to development and progress.  
 
Most of the South Asian economies excluding India are not full democracies. Sri Lanka 
is widely recognized partial democracy
6 and ever since the civil war broke out in 1983, 
the autocracy levels have increased. Pakistan and Bangladesh have been often prone to 
military coups and thereby ending up as autocracies. During its 38 years of independent 
years, Bangladesh was under military rule for 18 years. The same is the case with 
Pakistan also. We believe that autocracies are associated with higher levels of income 
                                                 
6 Partial Democracy is said when the POLITY score for a country is between -5 to +6, while -5 to -10 is 
recognized as fully Autocratic country and +7 to +10 is deemed to be a fully democratic state (Marshall & 
Jaggers, (2005)).   12
inequalities as development process in autocratic countries is low. Though full 
democracy might not lead to complete decline in income inequality, but the levels of 
inequality in democracy can be lower compared to autocracies because in democracy the 
policy making bodies are accountable for the policies implementation process. To capture 
this effect, we include political regime variable which show a consistent negative sign 
which is statistically significant. Though the coefficient values are lower across the 
models, it proves that there is some association between democracy and income 
inequality. This shows that movement towards democracy is leading to decline in income 
inequality levels atleast in South Asia.   
 
Economic Development and population levels are positively associated with income 
inequality. Higher levels of population may certainly prove difficult for the government 
to deliver the public services and hence it might lead to income inequality. But we are 
now seeing the results of economic development being positive and this is also 
statistically significant across the models. A 1% increase in economic development is 
leading to 62% increase in income inequality.  
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This tells us that development process in South Asian countries is not inclusive. Infact 
this is precisely one of the reasons why income inequalities in these countries are still at a 
higher levels. Though the economic reforms process have ushered higher levels of 
economic growth, its benefits are not reached to the poor. The scatter chart shows the 
relation between economic development and income inequality for these four countries. 
The fit seems to be good as it depicts a perfect linear trend, suggesting the economic 
development indeed is leading to higher income inequalities. Further, we introduced 
economic growth in our model 6 along with economic development. There we find that 
economic growth is making a negative impact on income inequality, while the relation of 
economic development remains unchanged. However, the coefficient value of economic 
growth is very low compared to that of economic development. It shows that a 1% 
increase in economic growth is leading to a 1% reduction in income inequality and on the 
contrary, it is almost 70% increase in income inequality for every 1% increase in 
economic development. This shows that though economic growth is helping in reducing 
the income inequality, but this is not enough, as it is not translating into real gains interms 
of economic development, which is a proxy for standard of living. With this analysis one 
can argue that economic progress in the South Asian countries is not inclusive. There is 
much more interesting evidence to add further to these results. When we take a look at 
model 5, we find that the economic development when squared has a significant negative 
impact on income inequality. This is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
Thus, it shows that the present level of economic development is not sufficient to bring 
down the prevailing income inequality level. Certainly there is a need to further 
accelerate the economic development process in order to reduce the inequality by 
bringing into fold the deprived sections of the society into the ‘growth story’. In model 6, 
along with economic growth and economic development, we also introduce interaction 
between economic growth and development. We find that its impact is positive, but is not 
making any significant impact on inequality.  Theoretically speaking, if a country meets 
the condition of high income and high growth, inequality should eventually fall because 
people in the country would get employment opportunities with higher levels of salaries. 
But, this seems to be quite opposite in the case of South Asian economies as the results 
show that the real benefits of higher economic growth is not translating into high 
economic development. 
 
This being so, on the other hand, the social development process interms of secondary 
school enrollment ratios help reducing the income inequality. The results are statistically 
significant at 1% confidence level and are consistent across all the models. There is a 
moderate improvement in the case of Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. However, the 
case of Pakistan remains worrying as the progress shown is very little. Perhaps this is the 
reason why, the coefficient values are very low in this case. We also find that the 
government expenditure help reducing the income inequality. However, two things worth 
noting: the coefficient values are very lower at 0.80% suggesting that there is a scope for 
further improvement interms of better targeting the poor and increase spending on social 
and rural sector development schemes and projects and secondly, the significance level is 
not consistent across the models, suggesting the relationship is fragile. We also find the 
population levels are acting as burden interms of increasing the income inequality in 
these countries. The results are consistent throughout the models and the coefficient   14
values are reasonably strong. Past research also shows that higher levels of population are 
detrimental to the efforts to reduce income inequality in developing countries, where the 
public services are already in a bad shape. One of the other interesting findings of the 
study is the relationship with external aid. We find that the relationship is positive and is 
also statistically significant at 1% confidence level. This result is also exhibited 
throughout the six models. This goes on to show that the increase in external aid is not 
effecting the reduction in income inequality.  This brings us to the question on the usage 
of the external aid by respective governments. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
entire funds allotted under external aid category is properly spent by the governments and 
that is precisely why it makes minimum or not impact on reduction of income inequality. 
The best example perhaps is Pakistan as it received large sums in the form of aid from 
various developed countries like United States, but the situation at the ground level infact 
turned worst during the recent years. Finally, the time dummy shows a significant 
negative impact on income inequality in South Asia countries suggesting that as time 
pass by, there is an improvement in reduction on inequality.  
 
Those countries which are crippled with higher inequality levels and also have very high 
military dominance in the form of increased spending on military sectors like Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and to a minor extent Sri Lanka, feel that this could bring in more stability 
because military force help suppressing the dissidents in the society. However, on the flip 
side, there is an opportunity cost associated with higher levels of military spending as the 
growth in military expenditure comes at the cost of social sector spending. The classic 
example of such case is Pakistan and to an extent Sri Lanka. Thus, it goes on to show that 
there is a direct effect of military sector growth on income inequalities. This means that 
the regression results specified above are valid as long as there is no endogenous variable 
bias in the models. However, if we have the problem of endogenous variable, in other 
words, if military spending variable is endogenous to income inequality then in such a 
case we need to deal with the issue of endogenity and to find ways to obtain unbiased and 
consistent estimates. If estimates using a single equation model are biased and 
inconsistent, then it becomes necessary to estimate the determinants of income inequality 
with instruments that may be used to treat the endogenity bias coming from military 
sector growth. Therefore, in order to address the problem of endogenity, we create 
instrument variables for the endogenous variable (military expenditure). We postulate 
two instrument variables viz., internal threat and remittances. We were careful in 
choosing these variables because one of our major objectives was to see to that the 
instrument variables do not create reverse causality effect with the identified endogenous 
variable. We use Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) method for estimating the income 
inequality model again this time with instrument variables. The process of implementing 
TSLS is as follows: in the first-stage regression, we obtain the "estimated income 
inequality" and in the second stage we replace the military expenditure by the two 
instruments variables in equation (1) to obtain coefficient βi for equation (1).  
 
Table 4: Results of Military Expenditure equation with TSLS 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Military Expenditure (US $ Mn) 
Variables  TSLS Model - 9  Endogenity Test (stage 2) 
Model - 10 
       15
Constant 
-9.163 * 
(3.152) 
-6.486 ** 
(2.561) 
Log(Military Expenditure) 
0.062 *** 
(0.036) 
0.030 * 
(0.011) 
War Years 
0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
0.001 * 
(0.000) 
Political Regime? 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
-0.002 ** 
(0.000) 
Log(Population) 
0.401 * 
(0.150) 
0.330 ** 
(0.132) 
Log(Economic Development) 
0.747 * 
(0.105) 
0.584 * 
(0.067) 
Secondary School Enrollment 
-0.007 * 
(0.001) 
-0.006 * 
(0.001) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.013 ** 
(0.005) 
-0.005  
(0.004) 
Log(External Aid) 
0.037 * 
(0.013) 
0.029 * 
(0.010) 
Time Trend 
-0.025 * 
(0.006) 
0.368 * 
(0.118) 
Residuals (t-1) 
---- 
 
-0.017 * 
(0.004) 
     
 
R-squared  0.958879 0.932151 
Adjusted R-squared  0.954267 0.923830 
F-statistic  207.9238 112.0221 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 0.000000 
 
Instrument Variables used 
a. Remittances 
 
b. Internal Threat 
 
---- 
Total Observations  124 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. Model 09 is Two Stage Least Squares method, while model 10 
is OLS with fixed effects method. 
 
Model 9 shows that the estimates generated from the system of equations are highly 
robust. Overall, we find that the inequality model 9 provide the best fit to the data, with 
R-squared of 96% and adjusted R-squared value of 95%. These are higher than the earlier 
single equation models 3 to 8. We find that the military expenditure if increased by 1% is 
leading to an increase in 6.2% of income inequality. If we take a look at the coefficient 
value of military expenditure and compare this with the values in the models 3 to 8, we 
find that the value derived from model 9 has increased by six basis points. This is the 
effect of the two instrument variables which we have introduced into this model. Not 
only this, we find that there is a marginal increase in the coefficient values of almost all 
the variables in the model.  
 
Though we have the results of the TSLS with instrument variables for the endogenous 
variable, military spending, we would like to ensure whether there is possible endogenity   16
or not in between the two (income inequality & military expenditure). For this, we 
perform endogenity test. The values displayed of the model 10 are the final results of the 
total endogenity test. We begin with the first stage in endogenity testing. We introduce 
two instrument variables viz., remittances and internal threat variables into the structural 
equation model and we replace the dependent variable with military expenditure variable. 
We the run the model for this equation and we find that both the instrument variables are 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level against military expenditure. This shows 
that both the instrument variables which we have selected are the perfect fit for military 
expenditure. We name it model 11 and place these results in Annexure – 1 at the end. As 
a part of second step, we take the residuals of the TSLS model (model 9) and introduce 
those residuals as a separate independent variable in the single equation model with 
income inequality as dependent variable. The results are reported in model 10. We find 
that residuals of statistically significant at 1% confidence level suggesting that there is a 
genuine case of endogenity. In the same model, we also find that military expenditure 
remains statistically significant at 1% confidence level.  
 
4. Summary & Conclusion 
 
This study attempts to examine the effect of military spending on income inequality in 
four major South Asian economies from 1975 to 2005 time frame. We anticipate that as 
military expenditure increases, income inequality also increases, controlling for other key 
macro economic and institutional variables. Our findings show that there is a positive 
effect of military expenditure on income inequality. We base this model on the premise 
of opportunity cost burden effect theory which argues that that expenditure on military 
drains out the resources from public spending on social sector development, rural 
development spending, development of infrastructure and other social welfare programs 
that unarguably promotes social and human development and reduce income inequalities. 
Moving further, we also find there is a strong direct relationship between wartime 
military spending and income inequality and an inverse relationship between peacetime 
military spending and income inequality. This apart, we also find that economic growth 
though is leading to a slight decline in income inequality, but economic development 
process strongly encourages income inequalities in South Asia. This goes on to show that 
the economic growth is not translating into development and progress of all sections in 
the society. This suggests that the growth and development process in South Asia is not 
inclusive but exclusive.   
 
The major criticism raised by our paper pointing at the existing literature is about the 
problem of endogenity. We address this problem by introducing appropriate instrument 
variables using Two Stage Least Squares method. The instrument variables used 
includes: Remittances and Internal Threat, which do not cause for reverse causality. 
Before selecting the instrument variables, we tested for the problem of endogenity, which 
clearly shows that there is a serious problem of endogenity between military spending 
and income inequality. We then also conducted the test to know whether the instrument 
variables which were selected were appropriate or otherwise. The results proved to be 
positive for the both.  The results of Two Stage Least Squares are no different, but   17
certainly there is an improvement in the coefficient value of the endogenous variable 
(military spending), justifying the introduction of both instrument variables. 
 
Finally, we developed a simple model of determinants of military spending which we 
believe is the function of greater military activities (arms imports, arms trading, armed 
forces), conflict variables (presence of civil war and number of peace years), macro 
economic, and institutional variables. We obtain estimates that are robust, and are 
consistent with the literature. We strongly believe that given the range of socio economic 
and political problems ailing South Asian countries, these results gain paramount 
importance, suggesting that reduction in military spending could reduce income 
inequality, thereby paving way for economic development and progress. 
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ANNEXURES 
 
Annexure 1: Results of Endogenity Test (Stage 1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (Military Expenditure) 
Variables   Model - 11 
 
Constant 
26.03 
(19.66) 
Remittances 
-3.48E * 
(1.50E) 
Internal Threat 
0.001 * 
(0.000) 
War Years 
0.006  
(0.005) 
Political Regime 
-0.015 ** 
(0.006) 
Log(Population) 
-0.638 
(1.001) 
Log(Economic Development) 
-1.176 ** 
(0.583) 
Secondary School Enrollment 
0.028 * 
(0.009) 
Government Expenditure 
0.095 * 
(0.030) 
Log(External Aid) 
0.154 *** 
(0.080) 
Time Dummy 
0.098 * 
(0.031) 
 
R-squared 0.968147 
Adjusted R-squared  0.964383 
F-statistic 257.1852 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Total Observations  124 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level. The model is controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 4/3/08 
 
Publication Authors  Date 
 
No. 918: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY 
SPENDING & INCOME INEQUALITY IN SOUTH ASIA 
Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati  Feb 2008 
No. 917: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive Entrepreneurship: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Exploration 
Arnis Sauka  Mar 2008 
No. 916: MARKET RISK DYNAMICS AND COMPETITIVENESS 
AFTER THE EURO: Evidence from EMU Members 
Juan Piñeiro Chousa, Artur 
Tamazian & Davit N. Melikyan 
Feb 2008 
No. 915: An Impact Analysis of Microfinance in Bosnia and Herzegovina Valentina Hartarska & Denis 
Nadolnyak 
Dec 2007 
No. 914: Why are Optimistic Entrepreneurs Successful? An Application 
of the Regulatory Focus Theory 
Ruta Aidis, Tomasz Mickiewicz 
& Arnis Sauka 
Feb 2008 
No. 913: Measuring Underground (Unobserved, Non-Observed, 
Unrecorded) Economies in Transition Countries:  Can We Trust GDP? 
Edgar L. Feige and Ivica Urban  March 
2008 
No. 912: On The Trade Balance Effects Of Free Trade Agreements  
Between The Eu-15 And The Ceec-4 Countries  
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, 
Christophe Rault, Robert Sova & 
Ana Maria Sova 
March 
2008 
No. 911: Does Growth & Quality of Capital Markets drive Foreign 
Capital? The case of Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions  
from leading Emerging Economies 
Juan Piñeiro Chousa, Krishna 
Chaitanya Vadlamannati and 
Artur Tamazian 
Feb 2008 
No. 910: Determinants Of Barries To Quality Of Direct Foreign 
Investments – Evidences From South & East Asian Economies 
Juan Piñeiro Chousa, Krishna 
Chaitanya Vadlamannati , 
 Bitzenis P. Aristidis
  and Artur 
Tamazian 
Feb 2008 
No. 909: Further Theoretical and Empirical Evidence 
on Money to Growth Relation 
Alexandru Minea, Christophe 
Rault & Patrick Villieu 
Feb 2008 
No. 908: Rapid Economic Growth At The Cost Of Environment 
Degradation? - Panel Data Evidience From Bric Economies 
Juan P. Chousa, Artur Tamazian 
& Krishna Chaitanya V. 
Feb 2008 
No. 907: Impact of M&A on firm performance in India: 
Implications for concentration of ownership and insider entrenchment 
Sumon Bhaumik & Ekta Selarka  Feb 2008 
No. 906: Foreign Direct Investment and Structural Reforms: 
Evidence from Eastern Europe and Latin America 
Nauro Campos & Yuko Kinoshita  Jan 2008 
No. 905: From Workers to Owners: Survey Evidence on the Impact of 
Property Rights Reforms on Small Farmers in Two Regions in Romania 
Georgeta Vidican-Sgouridis and 
Annette Kim 
Jan 2008 
No. 904: Are Emerging Economies Fdi Inflows Cointegrated With Fdi 
Inflows Of China? – An Empirical Investigation 
Krishna Chaitanya, Vadlamannati 
& Emilia Vazquez Rozas 
 
Dec 2007 
No. 903: Some New Insights into Currency Boards: 
Evidence from Bulgaria 
Alexandru Minea and Christophe 
Rault 
Jan 2008 
No. 902: Should we care for structural breaks when assessing fiscal 
sustainability? 
António Afonso  and Christophe 
Rault 
Nov 2007 
No. 901: A Forewarning Indicator System For Financial Crises : The 
Case Of Six Central And Eastern European Countries 
Irène Andreou, Gilles Dufrénot, 
Alain Sand-Zantman, and 
Aleksandra Zdzienicka-Durand 
May 2007 
No. 900: Directional Mobility of Debt Ratings  Sumon Kumar Bhaumik and John 
S. Landon-Lane 
Nov 2007 
No. 899: The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in the MENA Countries: 
a Probit Analysis 
Sfia M. Daly  Oct 2007 
No. 898: Macroeconomic Sources of Foreign Exchange Risk 
in New EU Members 
Evzen Kocenda and Tirgran 
Poghosyan 
Oct 2007 
No. 897: Rapid Economic Growth And Industrialization 
In India, China & Brazil: At What Cost? 
Krishna Chaitanya.V 
 
Oct 2007 
No. 896: Factors influencing corporate governance in post-socialist 
companies: an analytical framework 
Andreas Heinrich, Aleksandra Lis 
and Heiko Pleines 
Oct 2007 
 